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V  Summary  and  Conclusions  36One  often  hears  Westerners  complain  that  laws  are  not  enforced  in
developing  countries.  "Good"  laws  are  on the  books,  but  in  reality  individuals
and  firms  evade  them  with impunity. For  example,  taxes  are  uncollected,
bankruptcy  laws  unenforced,  environmental  controls  ignored,  and  trade
restrictions  evaded. Furthermore,  corruption  often  flourishes  in  government
despite  repeated  condemnation  by public  leaders. How  can  these  patterns  be
explained?  Are the  legal  systems  of these  countries  in  chaos? Or do they
just  work in  other  ways,  more  obscure  to  Western  eyes?
This  paper  tries  to unravel  the  nature  of legal  processes  in
developing  countries  and  explain  how  and  why  they  may  differ  from  legal
processes  in  more  advanced  nations. Section  I identifies  three  broad
functions  of a legal  system  and introduces  the  central  theme  of the  paper--how
risk  and  information  costs  affect  manj  of the  cb-hracteristics  of the  legal
process. Section  II proposes  two  opposing  models--the  "formal"  and  the
"informal"--to  illustrate  different  means  by which  legal  functions  can  be
handled. While  these  models  are  presented  as contrasting  alternatives  for
purposes  of exposition,  neither  pure  prototype  exists  in  practice. Real  life
is  always  some  mixture  of the  two,  with  the  balance  shifting  from  country  to
country. Formal  and  informal  legal  processes  in  Indonesia  are  described  in
Sections  III  and  IV.
I.  Introduction
Functions  of a Legal  System
The  legal  system  of any  country  has  three  broad  functions.  The  first
function  is  to set  rules  and  standards  by which  society  ie to  operate. Both-2  -
the  feasibility  of impersonal  contracts  in  an economy  and  the  efficacy  of
government  regulation  will  depend  to a large  extent  on the  objectivity  and
dependability  of the  standards  set  by the  legal  system.
The  second  function  is law  enforcement.  For  governments  to  operate,
they  need  a  viable  means  for  taking  recourse  if  an individual's  actions  are
not in  line  with  the  rules  set  by the  lawmaking  process. Enforcement  need  not
always  be active,  because  the  mere  existence  of the  threat  will  act to  deter
wrongdoing  much  of the  time.
One important  aspect  of law  enforcement  is  oversight  of  government
administrators  themselves,  because  policy  can  be carried  out  only  through  such
third  party  agents. Oversight  is  needed  to insure  that  an agent's  actions
promote  the  letter  and  spirit  of the  legal  standards  set  by the  principal--in
this  case  elected  officials  and/or  top  government  policymakers--rather  than
any  divergent  personal  goals  of the  agent. Like  enforcement,  oversight  can
take  many  varied  forms  and  need  not  always  be  actively  pursued  to  be
effective.
The third  function  is  dispute  resolution.  Efficient  procedures  to
handle  grievances  that  may  arise  during  policymaking  and  administration  both
promote  the  willingness  to  comply  on the  part  of the  public  (thereby  easing
the  enforcement  function)  and  provide  a check  on agents'  actions  (thereby
easing  the  oversight  function). Furthermore,  a means  to  resolve  disputes
between  private  parties  is  needed  if private  contracts  are  to  be viable.
The  Role  of Risk  and  Information  Costs
The  central  theme  of this  paper  is  that  many  of the  characteristics
of the  legal  process  in  developing  countries  today  can  be explained  as  direct-3-
or indirect  adaptations  to risk  (whether  from  natural,  commercial  or political
sources)  and  to the  high  cost  of information  in  those  countries. These  two
variables  have  far-reaching  effects  on the  legal  system,  influencing  both  its
organization  and  its  day-to-day  operations.
In  primitive  societies
In  very  primitive  societies,  the  high  cost  of information  derives
from  the  general  lack  of  knowledge  concerning  the  laws  of nature  (evidenced  by
widespread  belief  in supernatural  forces)  and  the  rudimentary  technology
available  for  transportation  and  communications.  The  absence  of  writing
characteristic  of  many primitive  societies  further  contributes  to the  costs  of
obtaining  information,  because  no recourse  can  be  made to  documentation  if
questions  arise  concerning  past  events. Under  such  conditions  it is  difficult
to  determine,  for  example,  whether  a neighboring  tribe  is  trustworthy  in  trade
or whether  a particular  land  transaction  took  place  years  before.
The  high  cost  of information  contributes  to  an atmosphere  of general
uncertainty.  Furthermore,  the  lack  of technology  and  education  exacerbates
risks  from  natural  causes  such  as crop  failure  and  disease  that  would  be-4  -
presen:  to some  degree  even  with  full  access  to information.  1/  Natural  risk
is  perhaps  the  most  prominent  type  of risk  in  primitive  societies.  Commercial
risk  is  mitigated  by the  fact  that  most transactions  are  local  and simple  in
form,  and  political  risk  is  reduced  by the  traditional,  hierarchical,
relatively  stable  organization  of society.
Certain  common  characteristics  of primitive  legal  systems  reflect
adaptation  to risk  and  high information  costs.  2/  For  example,  collective
responsibility  of all  members  of a  kin  group  or village  for  offenses  committed
by one  member  is  a common  theme. This  promotes  self-policing,  placing  an
extra  burden  of control  on .. Lose  most likely  to know  the  personalities  and
predilections  of the  potential  offender. It also  serves  as a  deterrent,
because  an individual  will  be less  likely  to commit  an offense  if  the  risk  of
punishment  falls  on others  as well  as  on himself.
Other  adaptations  to risk  and  high  information  costs  in  primitive
legal  systems  include:
1/ As used in  thie  paper  risk  refers  both  to indeterminatesness  that  could  be
resolved  with sufficient  access  to  existing  information  (i.e.  uncertainty)
and  to  the indeterminedness  of chance  events  whose  outcome  could  not  be
known  even  with  unlimited  access  to  existing  information.  Some  forms  of
risk,  such  as the  risk  of drought,  of 'ertain  types  of  disease,  or of
political  upheaval,  are  systematic,  meaning  that  all  members  of  a society
are  likely  to be  afflicted  if any  one  member  is.  Insuring  against
systematic  risk  is  difficult  even in  the  best  of circumstances.  Other
types  of risk,  such  as the  risk  of accident  or of  death  in  childbirth,  are
nonsystematic  and  are  therefore  easier  to spread  across  the  members  of  a
society  through  collective  insurance  mechanisms.
2/  For  examples  of these  adaptations  in Indonesian  traditional  ("adat")  law
see  ter  Haar  (1962),  and  in European  common  law  see  Berman  (1978)  and
Holmes  (1881). Also  see  Posner  (1981)  for  further  discussion  and
references.-5  -
o  a reliance  on  collective  enforcement  action  to increase  the
likelihood  of detection;
o  the  invocation I  the  supernatural  to fill  an information  void  when
information  on natural  cause  and  effect  is scant;
o  the  use  of symbols  (such  as  gift-giving  or physical  identifying
marks)  to signal  intent  between  strangers  or physical  identifying  marks  to
provide  evidence  of ownership  in  the  bsence  of written  legal  documents;
o  a heavy  reliance  on witnesses  to insure  the  legal  validity  of
transactions;  and
o  a reliance  on custom  and  legal  presumptions  to reduce  information
needs  in  each individual  transaction.
In  developing  countries
The  costs  of obtaining  a specific  item  of information  generally  fall
as development  proceeds,  because  education  and  technology  improve  and  written
records  become  more  common. The  degree  of  unavoidable  risk  associated  with
natural  phenomena  such  as disease  and  crop  failure  is  also likely  to  decline
as the  accumulated  knowledge  of a society  grows  and  technology  improves.
However,  as the  scope  and  sophistication  of  human  interaction
increases,  the  complexity  of the  information  demanded  increases  as  well,  and
the  forms  of  risk  multiply. In  addition  to  risk  from  natural  causes  (such  as
diset  and  crop  failure),  new forms  of commercial  risk  emerge  as circles  of
commercial  and political  interaction  expand  beyond  the  family,  clan,  or
village. Political  risk  is  also likely  to increase  due  to  the  accelerated
rate  of political  change  characteristic  of  modernizing  societies  and  the
resulting  political  instability.  The  premise  of  high  risk  and  high-6-
information  costs  is  still  likely  to  apply  in  many  developing  countries  today,
particularly  when  compared  to  developed  countries  where  political  systems  tend
to be more  stable  and  means  of risk spreading  more  developed.
Specifically  among  the  factors  exacerbating  the  high  cost  of
information  in today's  developing  countries  are  the  following  six:
1.  Compared  to  more  advanced  economies,  developing  countries  still  face
a shortage  of physical  capital  for  investment  in transportation  and
communications  equipment. Furthermore,  the  low  level  of per  capita  income
inhibits  demand  and  thus  restricts  the  scale  of capital  investment.  Roads  are
likely  to be poor,  telephone  lines  unreliable,  and  mail  service  slow. More
remote  areas  may  be entirely  unreachable  through  modern  means  of transport  and
communication.
2.  Governments  in  developing  countries  also  face  a shortage  of human
capital. The  educational  system  is poor,  lacking  a sufficient  number  of
well-trained  instructors  and  adequate  funding  for  staff,  facilities,  or
supplies..  Poor  education  restricts  the  ability  of civil  servants  to  process
information  accurately  and  efficiently. It  also  limits  the  ability  of the
members  of the  society  to carry  out  relevant  research  and  to accumulate  a
stock  of knowledge  to lower  the  costs  of  obtaining  and  processing  information
in individual  cases.
3.  The  "watchdog"  professions,  such  as accounting  and  journalism,  are
still  in relative  infancy. In Indonesia,  accounting  standards  are  not
well-developed,  the  number  of  well-trained  accountants  is limited,  and  the
accounting  profession  is  not effectively  regulated  by itself  or by  outside
parties. Although  the  press  is  not  explicitly  controlled,  its  freedom  is
limited  in practice  by government  licensing  practices.-7  -
4.  Because  of limited  facilities  and  training,  the  investigative
machinery  of the  state  is  not  as efficienc  as in  developed  countries.
5.  Reporting  requirements  do not  exLst  or  are  not  regularly  followed  by
companies  in  developing  countries,  in  part  because  of the  absence  of credible
enforcement  tools.
6.  The  public  sector  does  not  have  a  well-developed  tradition  of
recordkeeping  and  reporting. For  ezample,  no Indonesian  court  other  than  the
Supreme  Court  publishes  its  decisions,  and  the  Supreme  Court  has  only  begun  to
publish  cases  recently. Furthermore,  the  reports  that  are  prepared  are  not
readily  available  to  outsiders. Accounting  firms  typically  hire  tax  officials
to "leak"  important  documents,  such  as copies  of advisory  opinions
interpreting  regulations  or even  the  regulations  themselves.
For  these  and  other  reasons,  developing  countries  face  higher
information  costs  than  developed  countries.
II.  Two  Models  of the  Legal  Process
Two  contrasting  models  of a legal  system  illustrate  the  far-reaching
impact  of risk  and information  costs  on the  legal  process. Most  Westerners
are  likely  to be  most  f&miliar  and feel  most  comfortable  with  the  first  model,
but  the  second  is  more  likely  to  approximate  reality  in  much  of the  developing
world.
The  "Formal"  Model  A
An independent  and  well-functioning  formal  legal  system  provides  the
underpinnings  for  the  first  model  of the  legal  system,  the  "formal  model".-8-
This  model  reflects  in  large  part  Max  Weber's  ideas  on the  ideal  type  of
bureaucratic  organization.  3/  Furthermore,  it tends  to reflect  the  system  of
government  pictured  in  the  formal  constitutions  and  laws  of  many  countries,
although  it  may  differ  markedly  from  actual  practice  in these  countries. The
formal  model,  exists  nowhere  in perfect  form,  although  elements  of it  may  be
found  in  most  countries,  particularly  in  developed  countries  where  lower
information  costs  and  more  impersonal  mechanisms  for  the  spread  of risk
increase  its  feasibility.  When  Western  advisors  work  in  nonwestern  countries
helping  to  design  policies  and  draft  laws,  this  model.  often  forms  the  basis,
whether  consciously  or unconsciously,  of their  hopes  and  expectations
concerning  the  role  of the  legal  system  in public  administration.  It is
presented  here  primarily  to provide  a contrast  with  the  informal  model
described  later.
In fulfilling  the  three  legal  functions  of standard  setting,
enforcement,  and  dispute  resolucion,  the  formal  model  is  characterized  by
"'rule  by law",  divided  responsibilities,  bounded  discretion,  and  merit-based
incentives.  Because  of the  successful  fulfillment  of these  functions,
substantive  results  mirror  the  goals  embodied  in the  laws  passed  by the
legislature.  The  model  is  pictured  in  Figure  1  and  the  characteristics  of the
legal  process  envisioned  in the  model  are  described  below.
3/  Weber  (1947),  p. 330.-9-
Figure  1  The  formal  model  of the  legal  process
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Standard-setting:  "rule  bv law".
In the  formal  model,  standards  are  set  by the  legislature  and  the
courts  through  the  passage  of laws  and  the  resolution  of cases. Government
policy  and  substantive  law  are  synonymous.  in  that  the  law  reflects  the
policy,  and  no policy  is  to be implemented  except  as provided  by law. For
example,  a law  providing  for  a tax  rate  of 35  percent  means  that  such  rate  has
been  decided  upon  as the  proper  policy  and  will  be applied  in  practice  to  the
extert  possible. Laws  function  as clear  directives  and  are  taken  seriously  as
guides  to  administrators,  the  judiciary,  and  the  public. Laws  are  intended  to
be applied  consistently  and  universally.
Enforcement  and  dispute  resolution:  divided  responsibilities
and  bounded  discretion
Admiuistration  of governmental  functions  is organized  hierarchically
in the  formal  model,  with  responsibilities  over  discrete  tasks  divided  among
personnel  to promote  specialization  and  expertise. Policymaking  is  carried
out  by the  legislature  and  is clearly  divided  from  administration.  "Legal"
functions  of enforcement  and  disDute  resolution  are  assigned  primarily  to
separate  formal  legal  bodies,  including  courts,  the  police,  and  the  public
prosecutor's office.
Each  official  position  carries  with it  a specified  and  limited  sphere
of competence  regardless  of the  person  occupying  it.  Clear  and  orderly
procedures  specify  iow  tasks  are  to  be accomplished.  The  discretion  of
officials  is limited  in  the  formal  model  by the  clear  standards  set  in  the
substantive  law  and  court  decisions  and  by the  checks  and balances  provided  by
internal  and  external  oversight  procedures.  No individual  has  a total
monopoly  over  a decision,  without  possibility  of review  by another,  and  final- 11  -
review  rests  with  the  top  level  of the  formal  legal  system. Access  to
information  is  dispersed  to  accommodate  review.
The  nature  of standards: a focus  on substantive  concerns
Standards  set  by laws  and  regulations  in  the  formal  model  reflect  the
substantive  concerns  of the  public  and  its  elected  leaders. For  example,  the
tax  law  reflects  the  legislature's  decisions  as to the  optimal  amount  of
revenue,  degree  of progressivity,  and  incentive  structure  produced  by the  tax
system. Administrability  is  not  a central  concern  of legislators;  they
presume  that  whatever  substantive  provisions  they  decide  on  will  be
implemented  by the  tax  administration  as  directed  by law.
Oversight: incentives  linked  to  merit
The  rewards  and sanctions  applied  to  administrators  (;ncluding
officials  carrying  out  legal  functions  such  as law  enforcement)  in  the  formal
model  are  directly  related,  at least  in  part,  to their  performance  in
furthering  the  attainment  of policy  goals. The incentive  system  is
finely-tuned  and  reliable.
Candidates  are  selected  on the  basis  of technical  qualifications.
Once selected,  they  are  subject  to  authority  only  with respect  to their
official  obligations,  and  they  owe  allegiance  not  to an individual  but  to  an
impersonal  order. In the  office  there  is  a spirit  of professionalism,  of
"formalistic  impersonality",  without  the  intrusion  of personal  concerns.
Official  service  is  a career,  the  sole  (or  at least  primary)
occupation  of the  incumbent.  Promotion  is  dependent  on the  judgment  of
superiors  in the  officially-defined  hierarchy,  and is  based  at least  in  part
on merit. Although  internal  procedures  determine  rewards  and  sanctions  in the- 12  -
first  instance,  such  determination  is subject  to review  by  external  oversight
bodies,  including  the  formal  legal  system.
Results: In  accordance  with  substantive  law
The  outcome  of policymaking  in the  formal  model  is the  attainment  of
policy  goals  through  the  full  enforcement  of the  letter  of the  relevant  law.
For  example,  because  of effective  enforcement,  oversight,  and  dispute
resolution,  the  passage  of a  new  tax  law  results  in  the  collection  of  the
potential  revenues  due  given  the  provisions  of the  new  law.  Similarly,  new
regulatory  initiatives  direct  and/or  restrain  business  activities  along  the
lines  laid  out in  the  laws. Because  results  closely  match  expectations,
careful  quantitative  analysis  of the  impact  of proposed  legislation  is
warranted.
What  are  the  implications  of this  model  of public  administratien  for
the fulfillment  of legal  functions? In  essence  it implies  that  legal
standards  are  clear,  that  enforcement  of  written  laws  is  complete,  that
oversight  of officials  is  effective,  insuring  the  fulfillment  of professional
responsibilities,  and  that  disputes  between  government  and  private  parties  are
resolved  fairly  and  efficiently  by specialized  organizations,  primarily  the
formal  legal  system.
The  Effect  of  Risk,  Uncertainty,  and  Information  Costs
The critical  shortcoming  of the  formal  model  of the  legal  system  is
its  reliance  on the  easy  availability  of information  and  on impersonal  means
of risk  spreading. It implicitly  assumes  all  participants  are  informed  about
the  contents  of the  substantive  law,  about  the  activities,  performance  and
motivation  of other  civil  servants,  and  about  the  effects  of  government- 13  -
actions. No question  is  raised  as to  how such  knowledge  is  arrived  at  or to
what resources  must  be  used  in attaining  it.  Furthermore,  because  impersonal
means  are  assumed  to exist  to spread  risks,  individuals  need  not  depend  0i
each  other  for  security  and  can  thus  interact  on an entirely  objective  and
professional  basis.
The formal  model  does  not  describe  reality  in  either  developed  or
developing  countries.  That  the  reality  of government  administration  in the
United  States  is  different  from  this  model  is  clear  to  most  Americans. Many
laws  on the  books  are  not  enforced  in practice,  either  because  the  laws  no
longer  fit  society's  conceptions  of right  and  wrong  or  because  full
enforcement  would  be prohibitively  expensive. For  example,  minor  drug
offenses  are  often  overlooked  by the  police,  not  all  taxes  owed  to  the
government  are  in  fact  collected  by the  IRS,  and  speed  limits  are  not
rigorously  adhered  to by the  population.  Furthermore,  loafing  on the  job,
personal  favoritism,  and  outright  corruption  are  all  present  to  varying
extents  in  U.S.  public  administration.
The  divergence  of reality  from  the  formal  model  is even  more
pronounced  in  developing  countries  such  as Indonesia. The  weakness  of formal
legal  protections  and  corresponding  reliance  on patron-client  ties  for
security  enhance  the  subjective  nature  of personal  relationship  both  within
the  civil  service  and  between  government  officials  and  private  citizens. The
high  cost  of information  inhibits  the  operation  of  overdight  mechanisms  that
serve  to limit  monopoly  and  discretion  within  government  offices. The
resulting  reality  is  more likely  to  approximate  the  second  model  of the  legal
system  and  policy  administration,  the  "informal  model."- 14  -
The "Informal"  Model
An assymetric  distribution  of both  information  and  risk  aversion,
with resulting  principal-agent  problems,  underlies  the  informal  model  of the
legal  system  depicted  in  Figure  2.  In  contrast  to the  Weberian  formal  model
described  avove,  the  informal  model  of the  legal  process  has  the  following
characteristics.
Standard-setting:  uncertain  standards
Clear  legal  standards  are conspicuously  absent  in  the  informal
model. Although  the  legislature  may  have the  task  of setting  standards
through  the  passage  of laws  and  the  judiciary  may  have the  task  of setting
standards  through  the  resolution  of  disputes,  neither  has  sufficient
expertise,  authority,  or access  to  day-to-day  information  needed  to carry  out
the  standard-setting  function. As "agents"  for  the  legislature,  government
ministers  may  or may  not  follow  the  letter  of the  law  in issuing  decrees  and
regulations.  As "agents"  for  the  ministers  and  the  courts,  lower-level
officials  may or  may  not  follow  laws,  decrees,  regulations,  and  court
decisions  in  carrying  out  their  official  duties. Inconsistent  standards  for
the  public  at large  result  from  these  multiple  levels  of principals  and  agents
within  the  government  hierarchy.
Enforcement  and  dispute  resolution:  concentrated  authority
and  wide  discretion
The  distribution  of authority  among  governmental  organizations  in the
informal  model  reflects  the  high  cost  of information.  This  high  cost  sets
limits  on the  extent  of information  exchange  and  leads  officials  to avoid
delegation  of power  to  agents  whenever  possible. With  regard  to  the- 15 -
Figure 2  The informal model of the legal process
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horizontal  distribution  of authority  among  supposedly  equal  branches  of
government,  rather  than  divide  the  responsibility  for  various  functions  among
the  different  branches  (which  would  require  a constant  exchange  of
information),  authority  over  any  particular  substantive  area  tends  to be
concentrated  within  one  office. Not  only  policymaking  and  administrative
functions  but  also  legal  functions  of enforcement  and  dispute  resolution  tend
to  be  monopolized  by the  administrator  with  first-hand  access  to  relevant
information.  Therefore,  administrators  rather  than  formal  legal  institutions
become  the  primary  legal  actors  in the  informal  model.
With  regard  to the  vertical  distribution  of  authority  among
administrators,  delegation  of authority  to  agents  is  avoided  whenever  possible
because  of the  difficulties  of  monitoring  their  activities.  The  high  cost  of
information  inhibits  centralization  in  certain  instances,  however,  placing
significant  practical  authority  at lower  levels  of the  bureaucracy.
Because  of limited  oversight  capability,  officials  have  wide
discretion  as they  carry  out  enforcement  and  dispute  resolution  functions.
The  result  can  be personalized,  ad  hoc  and  rather  arbitrary  legal
procedures.  Discretion  is  limited  only  by cultural  adaptations  to risk,
namely  the  highly  subjective  nature  of interpersonal  relationships  and  the
emphasis  placed  on the  avoidance  of confrontation.
The  nature  of standards: a fncus  on  enforceability
Because  of the  monopoly  position  of officials  with  access  to
information,  day-to-day  standard-setting  is  closely  intertwined  with  the
administration  of such  standards. Therefore,  the  substance  of policies  is
more oriented  toward  administrative  concerns  than  in  the  formal  model.- 17  -
Without  outside  bodies  (such  as courts)  to assist  reliably  in  enforcement,
policy  makers  try  to facilitate  enforcement  by setting  up "roadblocks"  and
interlocking  requirements  in  an  attempt  to force  private  parties  to reveal
information  and  comply  with legal  requirements.  Five  common  characteristics
of such  policies--the  stress  on preventive  screening,  on linkages  between
administrative  systems,  on third-party  responsibility,  on presumptions,  and  on
simplicity  in  policy  design--are  illustrated  in the  Indonesian  case  in Section
IV  below.
Oversight: non-targeted  incentives
In contrast  to the  merit-based  incentives  of the  formal  model,
incentives  and  oversight  in the  informal  model  are  not  necessarily  tied
directly  to  merit. High  information  costs  and  cultural  adaptations  to risk
impede  oversight  for several  reasons.
First,  setting  clear  objectives  and  measuring  their  degree  of
attainment  is  difficult. Multiple  and  often  ill-defined  monetary  and  social
objectives  tend  to  exist. Readily  identifiable  and  measurable  objectives  can
be expected  to take  priority  in  practice,  while  those  that  are  more  obscure  or
harder  to  quantify  fade  into  the  background.
Second,  the  value  of individual  performance  in  furthering  group
objectives  is  often  difficult  to  measure  accurately.  Factual  information  on
individual  actions  may  be hidden  by the  organizational  forces--nondelegation,
monopolization  of tasks,  intentional  restriction  on outside  access  to
records--identified  earlier. In  addition,  cultural  adaptations  to  risk
inhibit  the  flow  of information  on performance,  as people  are  hesitant  to
upset  interpersonal  relationships  by criticizing  each  other. Furthermore,- 18-~
setting  objective  performance  standards  is  difficult  when  government's  output
is  a public  good  because  of the  lack  of competition  from  other  "producers."
Third,  overseeing  supervisors  tend  to  be hesitant  to  assert
authority. They  often  lack  accurate  information  on the  actions  of employees
and  the  impact  of such  actions. In  addition,  they  ixesitate  to  disrupt
personal  relationsaips  and sometimes  fear  that  applying  sanctions  will  rebound
to  their  own  personal  harm,  give  the  possibility  of reprisal  from  powerful
persons  against  which  the  formal  legal  system  provides  no protection.
Furthermore,  the  authority  to  apply  sanctions  against  one  person  is  of
questionable  legitimacy  in the  minds  of  many  civil  servants  in  developing
countries,  given  low  official  salaries  and  the  fact  that  many  other  people  may
appear  culpable  as  well.
In  addition,  while  assymetric  information  in the  employer-employee
relationship  points  to the  need  to  place  greater  risk  on the  employee  by
linking  rewards  more  closely  with  performance,  assymetric  risk  aversion  points
in  the  opposite  direction. Lower-level  civil  servants  generally  have  limited
means  and  are  risk-averse,  while  employers  (superior  officials)  have  wider
responsibilities  and  are  likely  to be less  risk-averse  with regard  to the
actions  of any  particular  employee. Placing  greater  risk  on the  employee--the
party  with greater  access  to information--would  therefore  not  necessarily  be
the  most  efficient  solution  to  the  oversight  problem.  4/
Because  of these  barriers  to  merit-based  incentives,  salary  and
promotions  in  the  informal  model  are  based  exclusively  on noncontroversial  and
4/  For  an analogous  argument  in  another  context,  see  Joseph  E. Stiglitz,
"Incentives  and  Risk  Sharing  in  Sharecropping,"  Review  of Economic
Studies,  April  1974,  pp.  219-225.- 19  -
easily  measurable  indices,  such  as educational  background  and  seniority. Such
nontargeted  itncentives  do little  to  motivate  civil  servants  to  achieve
particular  policy  goals. They  can  also  lead  to  adverse  selection,  attracting
less  capable  or less  honest  persons  to  the  civil  service. More  capable  and/or
honest  persons  may  be unwilling  to  work if  the  compensation  offered  is  less
than  their  worth  to the  organization.
Results: ad  hoc  adjustment,  negotiation,  and  red  tape
The  combination  of unclear  and  loosely  applied  standards,  monopolized
authority,  wide  discretion,  and  nontargeted  incentives  leads  to a relatively
undisciplined  bureaucracy  in  which  negotiation  is  commonplace.  Rather  than
lobby  primarily  at the  lawmaking  stage,  private  parties  potentially  affected
by policy  change  can  wait  until  a  general  law  is  enacted  and then  lobby
administrators  for  individualized  relief  or additional  benefit. Without
effective  oversight,  administrators  as well  as private  parties  stand  to  gain
from  such  negotiation.  Only  highly  visible  and  quantifiable  public  interest
goals  have  a chance  of being  met. Other  public  interest  goals  are  likely  to
be  submerged  in  a sea  of private  interest  concerns.
Outlined  above  are  two  contrasting  models  of the  legal  process,  one
(the  "formal")  dependent  on the  assamption  of low information  costs  and the
other  (the  "informal")  characterized  by adaptation  to high  information  costs
and  the  absence  of impersonal  means  for  risk-spreading.  Although  many
Westerners  may  expect  to find  the  formal  model  in  operation  in  Indonesia,  the
informal  model  of the  legal  process  is  the  more  applicable  of the  two  in that
environment,  as is  evident  from  the  case  study  described  below.- 20  -
III. The  Role  of Formal  Legal  Institutions  in  Indonesia
While  the  legal  functions  to be  filled  in  a  complex  economy  may be
similar  from  country  to  country,  the  methods  used  to  fill  them  vary
tremendously.  Western  democracies  tend  to depend  relatively  heavily  on courts
and  formal  administrative  procedures,  although  this  dependence  is  by  no mean
exclusive.  The  power  and  independence  of the  Western  judiciary  grew  out  of
complex  cultural,  historical,  economic,  and  political  developments,  and  it is
by  no means  preordained  that  a similar  place  for  formal  legal  institutions
will  evolve  in all  societies.
In practice  th3  vole  of the  formal  legal  system  in Indonesia  is far
less  prominent  at the  national  level  than  its  corresponding  role  in  advanced
Western  countries,  5/  although  on the  surface  it is structured  much  like  those
systems  in the  West  (with  a Constitution,  a commitment  to  "rule  by law",  three
branches  of government,  three  tiers  of courts,  judges,  prosecutors,  and
lawyers).  6/  Access  to  courts  or  other  formal  means  for  enforcement  and
dispute  resolution  7/ is  expensive,  proceedings  are  time-consuming,  decisions
are  unpredictable,  the  power  and  prestige  needed  to enforce  decisions  is
lacking,  and  corruption  is  widespread. Few  Indonesians  turn  to the  formal
5/  See  Moertono  (1963),  Lev (1965,  1972,  1978),  Feith(1962),  and  Makarim
(1978).
6/  For  a description  of the  Indonesian  formal  legal  system,  see  Damian  and
Hornick  (1972).
7/  These  include  official  administrative  channels  for  enforcement  (such  as
the  seizure  and  auction  of property  for  tax  collection)  or for  dispute
resolution  (such  as internal  administrative  appeals  mechanisms  within
government  departments).- 21  -
legal  system  for  assistance  in  resolving  disputes  involving  business  or
related  issues  of economic  regulation  or  public  administration.  8/
Furthermore,  as discussed  below,  the  legal  functions  of standard  setting  and
overseeing  public  officials  are  often  carried  on outside  formal  administrative
and  judicial  channels.
Part  of the  explanation  for  the  minor  role  of the  formal  legal  system
in  Indonesia  lies  with  history. A few  entrepreneurial  personalities,  the  most
notable  in  recent  years  being  President  Sukarno,  decisively  L-.f¶venced  the
course  of legal  development.  Other  directions  might  have  begii  rtkitn  under  the
influence  of different  personalities  and  events.  9/
The  economic  forces  at  work in  the  environment,  particularly
adaptation  to risk  and  high  information  costs,  also  help to  explain  the  minor
role  of the  formal  legal  system. The  Indonesians  (particularly  the  Javanese)
have  always  preferred  compromise  and  conciliation  to the  strict  adherence  to
an impersonal  concept  of legal  right. The  emphasis  on  harmony  helps  to  assure
the  proper  functioning  of the  collective  insurance  mechanism.  that  spread
8/  It should  be noted  that  at the  local  village  level  Indonesians  do turn  to
courts  (often  Islamic  courts)  for  assistance  in  mediating  certain  types  of
civil  disputes,  such  as divorce,  land  matters,  criminal  cases,  and  the
division  of estates. Land  disputes  often  go  before  courts  precisely
because  of the  oral  culture;  without  written  records,  the  intervention  of
a mediator  is  necessary  to resolve  a dispute. This  discussion  of legal
processes  is  concerned,  however,  not  with  these  local  noncommercial
disputes,  but  rather  with legal  issues  involving  business  and  government
regulation  at the  national  level.
9/  Makarim  (1978). The  course  of historical  development  has  not  necessarily
led  to an  optimal  equilibrium.  The  process  of change  in the  legal  system
is slow,  and  only  a limited  number  of  configurations  can  be tried  in the
course  of  history. Those  in  power  typically  have  a vested  interest  in
maintaining  power,  thereby  further  slowing  the  process  of change  and
experimentation  that  could  lead  to improvement.- 22 -
risk.  It  also  helps  to  protect  a society  with  a high  population  density,  such
as Java,  from  the  risk  of violence  and  disruption  that  can  arise  from  the
clashing  of personal  interests.  Such  cultural  adaptations  to  risk serve  to
lessen  the  importance  of the  adversarial  proceedings  typical  of courts.
The  role  of the  formal  legal  system  is  further  diminished  when
information  costs  are  highI.  The  accuracy  of court  or  other  formal
administrative  proceedings  depends  on the  ability  of  all  parties  concerned  to
accumulate  facts  about  the  case. This  is particularly  difficult  when the
investigative  ability  of the  government  is  weak  and  the  means  available  to
private  parties  to  gather  information  are  limited.
Furthermore,  the  problems  of  high information  costs  and  weak formal
legal  procedures  tend  to reinforce  each  other. Some  information-gathering
devises,  such  as depositions,  can  work  only  when  the  legal  system  has  enough
credibility  to  force  disclosure.  In  addition,  judges  and  administrators  must
have  the  training  and  ability  to  understand  both  the  underlying  law  and the
facts  presented. Tax  law,  antitrust  law,  environmental  regulation,  trade
policy,  and  other  areas  of economic  regulation  can  all  involve  great
complexity. In  a developing  country  where  skills  are  particularly  scarce,  a
legal  system  without  great  prestige  or power  is  unlikely  to  attract  the  people
most  able  to  grasp  these  difficult  subjects.
In  sum,  the  present  Indonesian  judiciary  lacks  both  the  means  to
resolve  complex  cases  accurately  and the  prestige  to  require  action  on its
judgments  from  other  government  departments. Indonesian  legal  culture  further
diminishes  the  role  of this  and  other  formal  legal  institutions,  favoring  less
confrontational  and  less  formal  means  of handling  legal  functions.- 23  -
IV.  The  Informal  Legal  Process  in Indonesia
Given  the  nonconfrontational  culture  and  the  minor  role  of formal
legal  institutions,  informal  means  arise  to  handle  legal  functions  in
Indonesian  public  administration.  The  Indonesian  tax  administration  provides
a case  study  of the  informal  legal  model  in  practice. The  national  tax  laws
were  changed  in the  mid-1980s  with  outdated  colonial  tax  laws  being  replaced
by  new income  and  value-added  tax  laws  and  a new  law  on tax  procedures.  Many
of the  examples  discussed  below  refer  to the  pre-reform  situation  and  help  to
explain  the  motivation  for  the  legal  changes. Effective  reform  will  take
time;  while  changes  in  laws  can  occur  overnight,  old  habits  of administration
die  hard.
Standard-setting:  Substantive  Law  and  the  Legal  Process
Although  in  theory  statutes  must follow  the  Indonesian  constitution
and  decrees  must  conform  to statutes,  in  practice  Indonesian  statutes  are
typically  written  in  very  general  terms,  and  the  executive  branch  makes  a
large  body  of policy  through  presidential  and  ministerial  decrees. For
example,  in  the  pre-reform  tax  laws  ministers  were granted  the  authority  to
set  many tax  rates  and  define  taxable  entities. Even in  the  new laws,  which
tend  to  be more  specific  than  the  old,  such  items  as the  power  to set  VAT
exceptions  criteria  for  small  firms,  the  power  to change  VAT tax  rates  within
certain  bounds,  and  the  power  to  name  goods  subject  to luxury  tax  are  all  left
to governmental  regulation  or  ministerial  decree,  with  no guidelines  provided
in the  law.
In such  a legal  system  ministers  are in  effect  acting  as  agents  for
the  government.  Yet  there  is  no assurance  that  ministerial  decrees  will- 24  -
necessarily  follow  the  letter  of the  law. Neither  Parliament  nlor  the  courts
have  recourse  to insist  on the  primacy  of statutes. Although  by law  the
courts  have  the  jurisdiction  to  oversee  the  compatibility  of regulations  and
decrees  with  their  underlying  laws,  this  jurisdiction  is  not  exercised  in
practice. The  strength  of the  executive  branch  in  Indonesia  reinforces  the
already  natural  tendency  for  all  access  to information  to  be concentrated
within  the  administrative  bureaucracy.  With  neither  the  information  nor the
cultural  predisposition  to  challenge  the  executive  branch,  the  legislature  and
the  courts  cannot  serve  a watchdog  role  over  detailed  regulatory
pronouncements.
As a result,  many  ministerial  decrees  depart  significantly  from  the
spirit  if  not the  letter  of the  relevant  statute. For  example,  although  the
old  wealth  tax  law specified  a tax  rate  of 0.5  percent,  this  rate  was  changed
by ministerial  decree  to 1.0  percent  in  1982  in  an attempt  to increase
revenues. Other  past  decrees  have  given  income  and/or  withholding  tax
exemptions  not supported  by statute  to  national  private  banks  who  merge;  to
scientists,  authors,  musicians,  and  artists;  to firms  going  public  on the
newly  formed  stock  exchange  and individuals  buying  those  shares;  to firms
using  certified  public  accountants;  and  to interest  on demand  deposits,  time
deposits,  bank  certificates,  small-saver  accounts,  marketable  securities,  and
Indonesian  bonds  sold  in  the  international  market. And  although  no such
exemption  was specified  in the  relevant  statutes,  foreign  contractors  and
consultants  working  in  Indonesia  on projects  funded  by foreign  aid  were  exempt
from  income  and  corporation  tax  by an  even  more  informal  means  than  a decree,
namely  a letter  from  the  Minister  of Finance  to the  Minister  of  Foreign
Affairs.-25  -
The looseness  with  with  ministerial  decrees  follow  statutes  is
mirrored  in the  looseness  with  which  the  civil  servants  follow  both  statutes
and  decrees  in  their  daily  administrative  activities.  Noncompliance  and
nonenforcement  are  evident  throughout  the  tax  system,  reflecting  both  the  high
cost  of information  and  personal  adaptation  to  risk.
The information  needed  to  enforce  governing  laws  and  decrees  on the
public  is  expensive. In  the  area  of tax  law,  enforcement  depends  on good
recordkeeping  by the  public  and  accurate  audits  by officials;  neither  can  be
expected  on a wide  scale  given  the  low  average  level  of  education  in  the
country,  the  shortage  of professionals  trained  in  modern  accounting
techniques,  and  the  prevalence  of cash  transactions  in  general.
In  addition,  the  goals  of a particular  agent  (the  civil  servant)  may
differ  from  those  of  his  principal  (his  superiors,  the  legislature,  or the
courts). In  many  cases  the  actions  of an agent  may  serve  to  reinforce  a
patron-client  relationship  that  reduces  personal  risk  rather  than  serving  a
public  interest  goal  reflected  in  a law  or  decree. The  parties  concerned
(both  the  civil  servant  and  his  patron  or client)  will  have  an interest  in
hiding  their  activities  from  others,  making  it  even  more  difficult  for
superiors  to trace  the  activities  of their  subordinates.
Finally,  the  minor  role  of the  formal  judiciary  in  Indonesia  prevents
it  from  taking  an aggressive  role  in law  enforcement.  Other  institutions  must
compensate  if  any  threat  of penalty  is to  attach  to  noncompliance  with  laws
and  decrees.
In sum,  the  Indonesian  informal  legal  system  is  characterized  by a
lack  of clear,  consistent,  and  binding  standards.  Laws  may  be  contradicted  by
lower-level  decrees  and  regulations,  and  both  may be contradicted  by the-26 -
day-to-day  actions  of  administrators.  Because  of the  presence  of high  risk
and  the  interpersonal  relationships  that  arise  to reduce  it  in the  individual
case,  the  motivations  of  agents  are  likely  to diverge  significantly  from  those
of their  principals.  High  information  costs  lead  to agency  problems  at each
level  of the  legal  hierarchy. The  concept  of strict  rule  by law  envisioned  in
the  formal  model  is  not  feasible  in  practice.
Enforcement  and  Dispute  Resolution:
Organizational  Structure  and  the  Legal  Process
The  organizational  structure  of the  Indonesian  Directorate  General  of
Taxation  reflects  the  compartmentalization  and  monopolization  of substantive
areas  likely  to  arise  when  information  costs  are  high.  The  organization  is
divided  into  five  Directorates  along  substantive  lines. Relatively  little
interaction  or  cooperation  exists  among  them  in  carrying  out  their  everyday
work.  Different  taxes  are  handled  by different  personnel,  with little  sharing
of information  or mutual  assistance.  For  example,  the  Directorate  of  Direct
Tax  handles  matters  relating  to income  tax,  while  the  Directorate  of Indirect
Tax is in  charge  of value-added  tax,  although  similar  data  is  needed  for  both
jobs.
This  organization  is  mirrored  in  the  regional  and  district  tax
offices,  reflecting  the  strength  of  vertical  chains  of command. However,
because  of difficulties  in communication,  each  district  office  is  by necessity
relatively  autonomous  in  carrying  out  the  majority  of its  responsibilities.
Each stage  in  the  process  of enforcing  tax  law  is  profoundly  affected
by this  organizational  structure.  Initial  assessments  and/or  audits  for  each
tax  tend  to  be contro'led  entirely  by a small  group  in  a single  office,
without  much  horizontal  sharing  or  cross  checking  of information.  This  leads- 27  -
to a proliferation  of steps  in the  compliance  process,  as  a firm  must  deal
separately  with  each  group  in charge  of each  tax. It also  leads  to less
effective  administration,  as the  benefits  to cooperation  and  the  sharing  of
information  are  missed.
The insulation  and/or  horizontal  duplication  of function  continues  as
enforcement  proceeds. Because  of the  divided  responsibility  for  different
taxes,  in some  district  offices  up to six  different  sections  have
administrative  duties  relating  to tax  enforcement.  Yet  all  power  over
criminal  prosecution  is  retained  in  the  regional  and  head  tax  offices  because
of the  difficulty  of  overseeing  the  district  offices  and  the  consequent
hesitancy  to  delegate  important  decisionmaking  power. Access  to this  ad  hoc
and  discretionary  system  is  uneven,  and individualized  relief  for  more
important  taxpayers  who  voice  complaint  is  common. Taxpayers'  grievance
procedures  are  equally  compartmentalized,  with  most  power  and  discretion  over
important  cases  being  retained  by top  tax  administrators.  The  tax  court  has
neither  the  expertise,  the  information,  nor  the  credibility  to  deal  with
serious  cases. Its  caseload  consists  primarily  of small  sales  tax  matters.
Discretion  in  assessment  and  enforcement  is  constrained  not  primarily
by law  but  by cultural  and  political  norms. Three  major  constraints  are  the
cultural  aversion  to  open  confrontation,  the  hesitation  of officials  to
challenge  politically  powerful  taxpayers,  and  the  questionable  legitimacy  of
official  action  given  the  widespread  view  that  civil  servants  are  as much  to
blame  as taxpayers  for  the  country's  revenue  problems.
In sum,  the  distribution  of authority  and  responsibility  for
enforcement  and  dispute  resolution  in Indonesian  public  administration  is
influenced  by the  high  cost  of information.  This  high  cost  sets  limits  on the-28  -
horizontal  exchange  of information  and  leads  officials  to  avoid  delegation  of
power  to agents  whenever  possible. Administrators  rather  than  formal  legal
institutions  are  the  primary  legal  actors,  and  the  informal  legal  process
becomes  relatively  ad hoc,  discretionary,  and  personalized  when  compared  with
more  formal  legal  processes.
The  Nature  of Standards: Policy  Design  and  the  Legal  Process
Given  the  concentration  of legal  authority  discussed  above,  what is
the  rationale  behind  the  policies  that  emerge  from  the  standard-setting
process? Indonesian  tax  policy  is  heavily  influenced  by the  desire  to gather
information  to  promote  enforceability.  Five  common  characteristics  of tax
design  and  administration  can  be attributed  to the  combination  of high
information  costs  and  cultural  adaptations  to risk.
Preventive  screening
The  tendency  to  depend  on ex-ante  barriers  to  enforce  reporting
requirements  and  avoid  later  confrontation  can  be seen  in  the  reliance  on
universal  tax  assessment  under  the  old  income  tax  laws. While  under  the  self-
assessment  system  in  the  United  States  a taxpayer  is  assumed  to be following
the  law  unless  an  audit  proves  otherwise,  under  the  system  of universal
assessment  a taxpayer  is  not assumed  to have  complied  with  the  law  until  an
assessment  has  been  issued  and  paid  and  a final  tax  clearance  has  been
received  from  the  tax  department. Every  taxpaying  firm  and individual  must
pass  through  the  assessment  "barrier",  pursuant  to  which  books  and  record  must
be submitted  and  one's  business  premises  may  be searched  by tax  authorities
for  further  information.  Further  disputes  rarely  arise  once  this  barrier  has
been  crossed,  because  both  parties  have  had  the  oppportunity  to  express  their-29  -
views  and  reach  an  acceptable  compromise  during  the  assessment  stage.  The  new
Indonesian  income  tax  law  provides  for  self-assessment,  although  the  impact  of
this  legal  change  on actual  practice  is  uncertain.
Linkages
Interlocking  requirements  serve  to  enforce  tax  laws  and  regulations
by raising  the  price  of  evasion  and  increasing  the  number  of officials
involved  directly  or indirectly  in  enforcement.  Again,  this  tends  to  be a
relatively  nonconfrontational  means  of  enforcement  and  therefore  congruent
with  customary  methods  of spreading  risk.
For  example,  a taxpayer  identification  number  must  be  obtained  before
applying  for  an investment  license,  applying  for  credit  from  state  banks,  or
passing  imported  goods  through  Indonesian  customs. Therefore,  evasion  of
taxpayer  registration  requirements  legally  disqualifies  one  from  making
investments,  obtaining  state-bank  credit,  or importing,  while  officials  of
these  various  government  organizations  are  enlisted  in  checking  that  tax
requirements  have  been  met.
Third-party  responsibility
The  extensive  reliance  on  withholding  of tax  by third  parties  is in
some  sense  analogous  to the  principle  of  collective  responsibility  common  in
primitive  legal  systems. The  withholder  is  in a  better  position  than  an
official  to  have information  concerning  the  tax  liability  of the  taxpayer. He
is therefore  given  the  responsibility  of seeing  that  this  liability  is
fulfilled  by  withholding  tax  from  amounts  paid  to the  taxpayer.
Withholding  on salaries  and  wages  is  prevalent  throughout  the  world
and  has  long  been the  backbone  of income  tax  enforcement.  In Indonesia,  over- 30 -
half  of individual  income  tax  collections  result  from  employer  withholding.
But  in  Indonesia  withholding  is extended  far  beyond  salaries  and  wages. Under
the  new income  tax  law,  tax  must  be  withheld  on payments  of interest,
dividends,  rents,  royalties,  technical  assistance  fees,  consulting  fees,  and
pensions.
The value-added  tax  has  become  a popular  form  of sales  tax  throughout
the  world  for  several  reasons,  not  the  least  being  the  increase  in
enforceability  arising  from  the  conflict  of interest  between  buyer  and
seller. Each  seller  must  collect  tax  from  the  buyer,  who  then  can  offset  this
tax  already  paid  against  payments  to the  state  treasury  of  tax  collected  on
its  sales. Each  seller  becomes  in  effect  a withholder  of  tax,  and  each  buyer
wants  to  assure  that  a tax  invoice  is issued  by  the  seller  for  each  sale  so
that  he can in  turn  use such  tax  as a credit  against  his  own  future  tax
liability. The  VAT,  which  on  April  1, 1985  replaced  the  previous  turnover
sales  tax  in Indonesia,  is  more  enforceable  than  other  types  of sales  taxes
because  of this  reliance  on third  party  responsibility  and  the  conflicts  of
interest  created.
The  use  of presumptions
A fourth  technique  used  in the  design  of tax  policy  to increase
enforceability  is the  reliance  on presumptions.  When  specific  factual
information  is costly,  approximations  may serve  the  purpose  adequately  at a
much lower  cost.
The  Indonesian  tax  administration  relies  heavily  on presumptions  to
establish  tax  liability.  In the  new income  tax  law,  for  example,  any small
firm  (defined  as one  with  annual  turnover  of less  than  Rp.  60  million)  may-31-
choose  to be taxed  using  assessment  norms. These  norms,  calculated  by
officials  and  published  regularly,  represent  average  profit  margins  for
various  types  of businesses.  They  can  be used  to  calculate  the  taxable  income
of small  firms  if  multiplied  by actual  turnover  figures  kept  by such  firms.
This  eliminates  information  requirements  that  would  be onerous  on both  small
businessmen  and  tax  administrators.
Simplicity
Perhaps  more than  any  other  characteristic,  simplicity  is  crucial
when information  costs  are  high. The  major  aim  of the  Indonesian  tax  reform
was to  simplify  the  structure  of tax  laws  and  regulations  so they  would  be
easier  to understand  and  administer.  Both  the  new income  tax  and  the  new
value-adeed  tax  are  among  the  simplest  in  the  world,  with  few  rates  and  few
exceptions  or exemptions.
These  characteristics  of tax  policy  in  Indonesia--preventive
screening,  interlocking  requirements,  third-party  responsibility,  the  use  of
presumptions,  and  an emphasis  on simplicity--enhance  the  enforceability  of tax
laws  and  regulations.  The  same  enforcement-enhancing  elements  of  design  also
characterize  other  economic  policies,  both  in  Indonesia  and in  other
countries.  One  example  in some  countries  is investment  licencing,  which
relies  heavily  on  preventive  screening,  interlocking  regulatory  requirements,
and  third-party  responsibility  to  regulate  investments  with  the  purported  aim
in  part  of preventing  industry  monopolization  in the  absence  of legal
antitrust  remedies. In addition,  it could  be argued  that  countries  favor
quotas  or import  bans  over  tariffs  in  part  because  of their  relative
transparency  and  heightened  enforceability.  Bans  are  particularly  easy  to*  32 -
enforce. This  possible  benefit  must  of course  be  weighed  against  the  economic
distortions  that  tend  to result  from  quantitative  restrictions.
In sum,  administrative  concerns  can  never  be entirely  separated  from
substantive  ones,  particularly  in  developing  countries  in  which  administration
is  hampered  by  high information  costs.
Incentives  and  Oversight
The  problems  of incentives  and  oversight  in  the  informal  model
described  in Section  II  are  all  evident  in the  Indonesian  civil  service. The
first  is  the  difficulty  of defining  objectives  and  the  resulting  priority
given  to  readily  identifiable  and  measurable  ones.  One  example  of this
tendency  is  the  reliance  of the  Indonesia  tax  system  on  monetary  tax  targets
as indicators  of achievement,  with  other  harder-to-measure  objectives  (such  as
an equitable  distribution  of the  tax  burden,  a minimization  of  tax-induced
distortions,  and  a  minimization  of  administrative  and  compliance  costs)  fading
into  the  background.
The second  problem  noted  in  Section  II is the  difficulty  of  valuing
individual  performance.  Given  this  difficulty,  governments  such  as
Indonesia's  adopt  incentive  systems  that  are  dependent  upon  easily  measurable
and  noncontroversial  valuables. In the  Indonesian  tax  administration  neither
salary  level  nor  promotion  is  directly  linked  to  performance,  but is  linked
instead  primarily  to  educational  background  and  years  of service. Such  an
incentive  system  is  unlikely  to motivate  the  type  of performance  that  leads  to
efficiency,  effectiveness,  and  neutrality  in  tax  administration.
The  weakness  of performance  evaluations  in the  tax  department  is
evidence  of the  third  problem--the  hesitancy  of supervisors  to assert* 33 -
authority. A promotion  is  theoretically  supposed  to  be supported  by
indicators  of merit,  as measured  by  evaluation  letters  prepared  by direct
supervisors  and  counterchecked  in turn  by their  superiors.  Such  evaluations
are  prepared  every  year  for  each  employee. Most  officials  are  unwilling,
however,  to  write  unfavorable  evaluations.  They  would  rather  give  a favorable
evaluation  to a poor  subordinate  than  risk  confrontation,  offense,  and
possible  reprisal. All  evaluations  become  homogenized  and  therefore  of little
worth  as indicators  of productivity.
The  same  factors  mentioned  above  in  relation  to internal  oversight
inhibit  the  assertion  of authority  by external  Indonesian  organizations  with
formal  oversight  jurisdiction.  First,  the  information  needed  for  effective
oversight  is  lacking,  hidden  in  part  by organizational  barriers  in the  absence
of judicial  means  to force  its  production. Second,  oversight  is  hampered  by
the  requirement  that  the  overseer  also  be an  expert  in the  field. For
example,  because  of the  need  for  expertise,  all  of the  persons  hired  by the
Inspectorate  General  to investigate  tax  officials  are  former  tax  officials
themselves,  and  some  may  return  to the  tax  department  after  a few  years  of
service  in the  Inspectorate  General's  office. A serious  conflict  of interest
results. Such  officials  may  be willing  to  carry  out  cursory  investigations,
but  it is  very  difficult  for  them  to point  an accusatory  finger  at a former
(and  perhaps  future)  colleague.
Third,  oversight  is  hampered  by the  deep  cultural  respect  for
hierarchy. To  carry  out  thorough  oversight  operations  would  involve  the
investigation  of higher-level  as  well  as low-level  officials,  and  low-level
overseers  would  be loathe  to investigate  their  hierarchical  superiors.-34 -
Fourth,  the  motivation  for  active  oversight  is  lacking. Publicity
concerning  public  abuse  of power  can  embarrass  the  government  (of  which  these
oversight  agencies  are  a part),  lead  to  fragmentation  in the  cohesive  support
system  it  provides,  and  risk inviting  retaliation.  Given  the  nontargeted
incentive  system,  which  applies  to the  judiciary  and  the  Inspectorate  General
as  well  as operational  departments  such  as the  tax  department,  productive  work
on the  part  of oversight  personnel  does  not  necessarily  carry  a promise  of
higher  income  or promotion.
Finally,  the  legitimacy  of strict  oversight  is questioned.  Punishing
one  official  for incompetence  or dishonesty  is  considered  unfair  if
others--particularly  officials  at  higher  levels--are  guilty.
As a result  of these  constraints,  oversight  by external  groups,
whether  the  Inspectorate  General,  the  judicial  system,  or other  governmental
or nongovernmental  bodies,  is  weak  in Indonesia.  When  combined  with  the
likelihood  that  internal  incentives  are  not  targeted  to performance,  the
result  is  a vacuum  of  oversight,  a failure  to fulfill  this  important  function
of a  modern  legal  system.
Improving  the  Outcome  of the  Legal  Process
As noted  in the  description  of the  informal  model,  the  combination  of
unclear  and loosely  applied  standards,  fragmented  and  monopolized  authority,
broad  discretion,  and  nontargeted  incentives  leads  to  a relatively
undisciplined  bureaucracy  that  pursues  only  the  most  quantifiable
objectives.  Given  the  widespread  uncertainty  and  discretion  and  the  shortage
of objective  legal  protections  characteristic  of the  informal  model,
negotiation  can  be expected  even  when  policymakers  and  administators  are- 35  -
acting  exclusively  in the  public  interest. But  private-interest  concerns  can
also  easily  flourish  in this  environment  because  of the  lack  of oversight.
The  extensive  reliance  on  negotiation  in Indonesian  government  administration
is  readily  summed  up in the  commonly-heard  phrase,  "All  taxes  are  negotiable."
Improving  the  legal  process  in developing  councries  such  as Indonesia
is  a  long-term  challenge. The  cultural  and  economic  roots  of  Lhe  existing
informal  system  are  strong  and slow  to change. Yet  efforts  to lower  the  cost
of information  to  policy  makers,  administrators  and  the  public  can  help.
Better  socioeconomic  data  can  help  policymakers  gauge  the  impact  of public
policies  on individuals  and  on  economic  activity. Better  information  on the
activities  of individual  administators  and  members  of the  private  sector  can
help  officials  oversee  performance  and  enforce  compliance  more effectively.
And improving  technical  expertise  among  government  officials  can  help  them
make  better  use  of whatever  information  is  available. Several  concrete  steps
that  could  be taken  include,  for  example,
- providing  monetary  support,  technical  assistance,  and training  to
central  statistical  services;
- training  more  administrators  and  overseers  in  specific  technical
fields,  such  as corporate  tax  law  and  auditing;
- investing  in  simple  information-processing  technology  for  the
storage  of  data (such  as taxpayer  files)  that  could  then  be readily
accessible  to  users  and overseers  alike;
- improving  the  organization  and  accessibility  of government  laws  and
decrees;
- publishing  regulatory  rulings  and  legal  cases  to serve  as forms  of
precedent;- 36  -
- tailoring  incentives  (such  as salaries  and  bonuses)  more  closely  to
the  achievement  of  group  objectives,  and
- stressing  simplicity  in  the  design  wf government  regulations  to
reduce  the  time  and  level  of expertise  needed  to  comply  with  them.
All  of these  steps  except  the  fourth  were  undertaken  to some  extent  in  the
Indonesian  tax  reform;  the  question  of incentives  for  civil  servants  remains  a
difficult  issues  in Indonesia  as in  other  developing  countries.
V.  Summary  and  Conclusions
The  efficiency  of public  administration  and  private  market  activity
in  any  country  depend  heavily  upon  the  ability  of the  country's  legal  system
to set  and  enforce  standards,  resolve  disputes,  and  oversee  the  actions  of
civil  servants. This paper  has  analyzed  several  important  characteristics  of
the  legal  process  in Indonesia. In so  doing  it  has  attempted  to  explain  many
of the  problems  of public  administration  that  affect  the  government's  efforts
to improve  tax  administration  and  promote  economic  development  in  general.
Among  the  most  important  conclusions  are  the  following  five:
1.  The  characteristics  of the  legal  process  in  any  country  are  heavily
influenced  by the  cost  of information,  the  extent  of  risk in  everyday  life,
and the  mechanisms  used  by the  society  of that  country  to  spread  such  risk.
2.  The  way legal  processes  are  handled  in  developing  countries  such  as
Indonesia  has  little  to  do  with the  way  the  formal  legal  system  operates.
Studying  the  formal  legal  system  alone  will  provide  little  insight  into  the
nature  of the  actual  legal  system. Because  of high  information  costs,  legal
processes--separably  identifiable  in  more  advanced  countries--tend  to be-37  -
inseparable  from  general  policymaking  and  administrative  functions  in
developing  countries.
3.  Although  progress  in  economic  development  may  require  a legal  system
that  provides  objective  standards,  reliable  enforcement  of such  standards,  and
procedures  for  the  efficient  resolution  of grievances  and  the  oversight  of
civil  servants,  high  information  costs  and  high  risk  in  developing  countries
inhibit  the  development  of such  a legal  system. Legal  development  may be  a
major  constraint  to  economic  development.
4.  Certain  forms  of direct  regulation  and  government  policies  of
intervention  in  the  marketplace  in  developing  countries  can  be seen  at least
in part  as substitutes  for  an independent,  well-functioning  legal  system.
5.  Lowering  the  cost  of information  and  enhancing  the  development  of
impersonal  market  mechanism  for  the  spreading  of risk  will  promote  legal  and
economic  development  in  developing  countries.
These  conclusions  have  operational  relevance  for  both  businessmen  and
policy  advisors  working  in  developing  countries.  Businessmen  used  to  Western
legal  environments  may  need  to  operate  quite  differently  in  developing
countries  such  as Indonesia.  Confrontational  tactics,  including  formal
litigation,  are  generally  counterproductive  in  cultures  that  depend  on
interpersonal  relationships  for  risk-spreading.  Furthermore,  legal  standards
are  likely  to  be quite  fluid. Written  laws  and  regulations  should  be seen  as
general  guidelines  but  not  considered  as necessarily  final  or binding  under
all  circumstances.  A rigid  search  for  legal  certainty  can  well  lead  to
frustration.  Flexibility,  an  ability  to locate  the  locus  of decisionmaking- 38 -
power  (not  always  readily  obvious  from  official  organization  charts),  and  a
willingnasis  to cultivate  personal  ties  are  likely  to  be important
characteristics  for  success.
Policy  advisors  must  be  extremely  sensitive  to  questions  of
administrability  and  enforceability  when  considering  policy  options  in  this
legal  environment.  A progressive  income  tax  and  a  value-added  tax  to  the
retail  level  may  be optimal  fiscal  policy  tools  from  a theoretical
perspective,  but  one  must  also  consider  issues  of administrability  and
enforceability  w1-:ch  may  well  inhibit  the  working  of such  tools. Furthermore,
some  policy  tools  (such  as liansing) that  appear  unduly  restrictive  to
Westerners  might  be  explained  at least  in part  as efforts  of  government  to
reduce  the  costs  of information.  Indeed,  they  may  be the  only  policy  tools
that  have  an impact  in  an environment  in  which  information  costs  are  high.
This  does  not  necessarily  justify  their  use,  but  it  does  call  for  a
consideration  of the  administrative  dimension  when  designing  policy.-39  -
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